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ABSTRACT 
 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with 
interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he makes the 
dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his 
theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. Worse, since he shows 
such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his previous work. The attempt 
to resurrect group selection by his friends at Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few 
years ago was one of the major scandals in biology in the last decade, and I have 
recounted the sad story in my article ‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—
how the Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked 
Evolution, Rationality and Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social 
Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ 
Unlike Nowak, Gintis does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by 
the strong desire to generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, 
made easy by the (near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology 
and blank slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. 
 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and 
other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe 
behavior. Of course, the framework needed to understand behavior is an 
evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he fails to provide one himself (according to his 
many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten corpse of group 
selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories he has generated in 
his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, like 
Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just blinds him 
to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the norm in science. As 
Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture and Value “There is no 
religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical expressions has been 
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responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” 
 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases its 
own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group selection. 
Furthermore, it has been well known and often demonstrated that group selection 
just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just 
another name for evolution by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in 
this arena for about 50 years and still has not grasped it, but after the scandal broke, 
it took me only 3 days to find, read and understand the most relevant professional 
work, as detailed in my article. It is mind boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson 
were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a century. 
 
I discuss the errors of group selection and phenomenology that are the norm in 
academia as special cases of the near universal failure to understand human nature 
that are destroying America and the world. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
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made easy by the (near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology 
and blank slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. 
 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and 
other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe 
behavior. Of course, the framework needed to understand behavior is an 
evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he fails to provide one himself (according to his 
many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten corpse of group 
selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories he has generated in 
his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, like 
Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just blinds him 
to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the norm in science. As 
Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture and Value “There is no 
religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical expressions has been 
responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” 
 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases its 
own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group selection. 
Furthermore, it has been well known and often demonstrated that group selection 
just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just 
another name for evolution by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in 
this arena for about 50 years and still has not grasped it, but after the Wilson scandal 
broke, it took me only 3 days to find, read and understand the most relevant 
professional work, as detailed in my article. It is mind boggling to realize that Gintis 
and Wilson were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a century. 
 
In the years after the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper was published in Nature, 
several population geneticists recounted chapter and verse on the subject, again 
showing conclusively that it is all a storm in a teacup. It is most unfortunate that 
Gintis, like his friends, failed to ask a competent biologist about this and regards as 
misguided the 140 some well known biologists who a signed a letter protesting the 
publication of this nonsense in Nature. I refer those who want the gory details to 
my paper, as it’s the best account of the melee that I am aware of.  For a summary 
of the tech details see Dawkins Article ‘The Descent of Edward Wilson’ 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/edward-wilson-social-conquest-
earth-evolutionary-errors-origin-species.  As Dawkins wrote ‘For Wilson not to 
acknowledge that he speaks for himself against the great majority of his 
professional colleagues is—it pains me to say this of a lifelong hero —an act of 
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wanton arrogance’. Sadly, Gintis has assimilated himself to such inglorious 
company. There are also some nice Dawkins youtubes such as 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4. 
 
Gintis has also failed to provide the behavioral framework lacking in all the social 
sciences. One needs to have a logical structure for rationality, an understanding of 
the two systems of thought (dual process theory), of the division between scientific 
issues of fact and philosophical issues of how language works in the context at issue, 
and of how to avoid reductionism and scientism, but he, like nearly all students of 
behavior, is largely clueless. He, like them, is enchanted by models, theories, and 
concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need 
to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language 
(language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear 
truthmakers, or as eminent philosopher John Searle likes to say, clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS)).  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness (intentionality, 
behavior) is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s (the 
Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the present by his successors 
Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I 
have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows 
show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of 
the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the 
Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR- Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality 
(LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -
the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of 
the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my 
other very recent writings. 
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The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table 
by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books 
on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision 
research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I have made detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, 
truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get 
us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical 
problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and 
hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
 
Gintis starts making dubious, vague or downright bizarre claims early in the book. 
It begins on the first page of the overview with meaningless quotes from Einstein 
and Ryle. On pxii the paragraph beginning ‘Third Theme’ about entangled minds 
needs rewriting to specify that language games are functions of System 2 and that’s 
how thinking, believing etc. work (what they are), while the Fourth Theme which 
tries to explain behavior as due to what people ‘consciously believe’ is right. That 
is, with ‘nonconsequentialism’ he’s trying to ‘explain’ behavior as ‘altruistic’ group 
selection mediated by conscious linguistic System 2. But if we take an evolutionary 
long term view, it’s clearly due to reciprocal altruism, attempting to serve inclusive 
fitness, which is mediated by the unconscious operation of System 1. Likewise, for 
the Fifth Theme and the rest of the Overview. He favors Rational Choice but has no 
idea this is a language game for which the exact context must be specified, nor that 
both System 1 and System 2 are ‘rational’ but in quite different ways. This is the 
classic error of most descriptions of behavior, which Searle has called The 
Phenomenological Illusion, Pinker the Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides ‘The 
Standard Social Science Model’ and I have discussed it extensively in my other 
reviews and articles. As long as one does not grasp that most of our behavior is 
automated by nonlinguistic System 1, and that our conscious linguistic System 2 is 
mostly for rationalization of our compulsive and unconscious choices, it is not 
possible to have more than a very superficial view of behavior, i.e., the one that is 
nearly universal not only among academics but politicians, billionaire owners of 
high tech companies, movie stars and the general public. Consequently, the 
consequences reach far beyond academia, producing delusional social policies that 
are bringing about the inexorable collapse of industrial civilization. See my ‘Suicide 
by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World’. It is breathtaking to see 
America and the European democracies helping citizens of the third world destroy 
everyone’s future. 
 
 
On pxiii one can describe the ‘nonconsequentialist’ (i.e., apparently ‘true’ altruistic 
or self- destructive behavior) as actually performing reciprocal altruism, serving 
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inclusive fitness due to genes evolved in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptation—i.e., that of our  very distant ancestors), which stimulates the 
dopaminergic circuits in the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, with 
the resulting release of dopamine which makes us feel good—the same mechanism 
that appears to be involved in all addictive behavior from drug abuse to  soccer 
moms. 
 
And more incoherent babble such as “In the context of such environments, there is 
a fitness benefit to the ‘epigenetic transmission’ of such ‘information’ concerning 
the ‘current state’ of the ‘environment’, i.e., transmission through non-genetic 
‘channels’. This is called ‘cultural transmission’” [scare quotes mine]. Also, that 
‘culture’ is ‘directly encoded’ in the brain (p7), which he says is the main tenet of 
gene-culture coevolution, and that democratic institutions and voting are altruistic 
and cannot be explained in terms of self-interest (p17-18). The major reason for these 
peculiar views does not really come out until p186 when he finally makes it clear 
that he is a group selectionist. Since there is no such thing as group selection apart 
from inclusive fitness, it’s no surprise that this is just another incoherent account of 
behavior—i.e., more or less what Tooby and Cosmides famously termed The 
Standard Social Science Model or Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’. 
 
What he calls ‘altruistic genes’ on p188 should be called ‘inclusive fitness genes’ or 
‘kin selection genes’. Gintis is also much impressed with the idea of gene-culture 
coevolution, which only means that culture may itself be an agent of natural 
selection, but he fails to grasp that this can only happen within the context of natural 
selection (inclusive fitness). Like nearly all social scientists (and scientists, 
philosophers etc.), it never crosses his mind that ‘culture’, ‘coevolution’,’ symbolic’,’ 
‘epigenetic’, ‘information’, ‘representation’ etc., are all families of complex language 
games, whose COS (Conditions Of Satisfaction, tests for truth) are exquisitely 
sensitive to context. Without a specific context, they don’t mean anything. So, in this 
book, as in most of the literature on behavior, there is much talk that has the 
appearance of sense without sense (meaning or clear COS). 
 
His claim on pxv, that most of our genes are the result of culture, is clearly 
preposterous as e.g., it is well known that we are about 98% chimpanzee. Only if he 
means those relating to language can we accept the possibility that some of our 
genes have been subject to cultural selection and even these merely modified ones 
that already existed—i.e., a few base pairs were changed out of hundreds of 
thousands or millions in each gene. 
 
He is much taken with the ‘rational actor’ model of economic behavior. but again, 
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is unaware that the automaticities of S1 underlie all ‘rational’ behavior and the 
conscious linguistic deliberations of S2 cannot take place without them. Like many, 
perhaps the vast majority of current younger students of behavior, I see all human 
activities as easily comprehensible results of the working of selfish genetics in a 
contemporary context in which police surveillance and a temporary abundance of 
resources, gotten by raping the earth and robbing our own descendants, leads to 
relative temporary tranquility. In this connection, I suggest my review of Pinker’s 
recent book—The Transient Suppression of the Worst Devils of Our Nature—A 
Review of The Better Angels of Our Nature’.  
 
Many behaviors look like true altruism, and some are (i.e., they will decrease the 
frequency of the genes that bring them about – i.e, lead to the extinction of their 
own descendants), but the point which Gintis misses is that these are due to a 
psychology which evolved long ago in small groups on the African plains in the 
EEA and made sense then (i.e., it was inclusive fitness, when everyone in our group 
of a few dozen to a few hundred were our close relatives), and so we often continue 
with these behaviors even though they no longer make sense (i.e., they serve the 
interests of unrelated or distantly related persons which decreases our genetic 
fitness by decreasing the frequency of the genes that made it possible). This 
accounts for his promoting the notion that many behaviors are ‘truly altruistic’, 
rather than selfish in origin (such as in sect. 3.2). He even notes this and calls it 
‘distributed effectivity’ (p60-63) in which people behave in big elections as though 
they were small ones, but he fails to see this is not due to any genes for ‘true 
altruism’ but to genes for reciprocal altruism (inclusive fitness), which is of course 
selfish. Thus, people behave as though their actions (e.g., their votes) were 
consequential, even though it is clear that they are not.  E.g., one can find on the net 
that the chances of any one person’s vote deciding the outcome of an American 
presidential election is in the range of millions to tens of millions to one. And of 
course, the same is true of our chances of winning a lottery, yet our malfunctioning 
EEA psychology makes lotteries and voting hugely popular activities. 
 
He also seems unaware of the standard terminology and ways of describing 
behavior used in evolutionary psychology (EP). E.g., on pg. 75 Arrow’s description 
of norms of social behavior are described in economic terms rather than as EP from 
the EEA trying to operate in current environments, and at the bottom of the page, 
people act not as ‘altruistic’ punishers (i.e., as ‘group selectionists’) but as inclusive 
fitness punishers. On p 78, to say that subjects act ‘morally’ or in accord with a norm 
‘for its own sake’, is again to embrace the group selectionist/phenomenological 
illusion, and clearly it is groups of genes that are trying to increase their inclusive 
fitness via well-known EP mechanisms like cheater detection and punishment.  
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Again, on p88, what he describes as other-regarding unselfish actions can just as 
easily be described as self-regarding attempts at reciprocal altruism which go astray 
in a large society. 
 
Naturally, he often uses standard economics jargon such as ‘the subjective prior 
must be interpreted as a conditional probability’, which just means a belief in the 
likelihood of a particular outcome (p90-91), and ‘common subjective priors’ (shared 
beliefs) p122. Much of the book and of behavior concerns what is often called ‘we 
intentionality’ or the construction of social reality, but the most eminent theorist in 
this arena, John Searle, is not discussed, his now standard terminology such as COS 
and DIRA (desire independent reasons for action) does not appear, he is not in the 
index, and only one of his many works, and that over 20 years old, is found in the 
bibliography. 
 
On p97 he comments favorably on Bayesian updating without mentioning that it is 
notorious for lacking any meaningful test for success (i.e., clear COS), and 
commonly fails to make any clear predictions, so that no matter what people do, it 
can be made to describe their behavior after the fact. 
 
However, the main problem with chapter 5 is that ‘rational’ and other terms are 
complex language games that have no meaning apart from very specific contexts, 
which are typically lacking here. Of course, as Wittgenstein showed us, this is the 
core problem of all discussion of behavior and Gintis has most of the behavioral 
science community (or at least most of those over 40) as coconspirators. Likewise, 
throughout the book, such as chapter 6, where he discusses ‘complexity theory’, 
‘emergent properties’, ‘macro and micro levels’, and ‘nonlinear dynamical systems’ 
and the generation of ‘models’ (which can mean almost anything and ‘describe’ 
almost anything), but it’s only prediction that counts (i.e., clear COS). 
 
In spite of his phenomenological illusion (i.e., the near universal assumption that 
our conscious deliberations describe and control behavior—at odds with almost all 
the research in social psychology for the last 40 years), he also shares the 
reductionist delusion, wondering why the social sciences have not got a core 
analytical theory and have not coalesced. This of course is a frequent subject in the 
social sciences and philosophy and the reason is that psychology of higher order 
thought is not describable by causes, but by reasons, and one cannot make 
psychology disappear into physiology nor physiology into biochemistry nor it into 
physics etc. They are just different and indispensable levels of description. Searle 
writes about it often and Wittgenstein famously described it 80 years ago in the Blue 
Book. 
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“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in 
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. 
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the 
real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I 
want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to 
explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive.” 
 
He is also quite out of touch with the contemporary world, thinking that people are 
going to be nice because they have internalized altruism (i.e., group selection), and 
with demographic realities, when he opines that population growth is under 
control, when in fact predictions are for another 4 billion by 2100 (p133), violence is 
increasing and the outlook is grim indeed. 
 
He sees a need to “carve an academic niche for sociology” (p148), but the whole 
discussion is typical gibberish (no clear COS), and all one really needs (or can give) 
is a clear description of the language games (the mind at work) we play in social 
situations, and how they show how our attempts at inclusive fitness work or go 
astray in contemporary contexts. Over and over he pushes his fantasy that 
“inherently ethical behavior” (i.e., group selectionist altruism) explains our social 
behavior, ignoring the obvious facts that it’s due to temporary abundance of 
resources, police and surveillance, and that always when you take these away, 
savagery quickly emerges (e.g., p151). It’s easy to maintain such delusions when 
one lives in the ivory tower world of abstruse theories, inattentive to the millions of 
scams, robberies, rapes, assaults, thefts and murders taking place every day. 
 
Again, and again, (e.g., top p170) he ignores the obvious explanations for our 
‘rationality’, which is natural selection –i.e., inclusive fitness in the EEA leading to 
ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategies), or at least they were more or less stable in 
small groups 100,000 to 3 million years ago. 
 
Chapter 9 on the Sociology of the Genome is inevitably full of mistakes and 
incoherence—e.g., there are not special ‘altruistic genes’, rather, all genes serve 
inclusive fitness or they disappear (p188). The problem is that the only way to really 
get selfish genetics and inclusive fitness across is to have Gintis in a room for a day 
with Dawkins, Franks, Coyne etc., explaining why it is wrong. But as always, one 
has to have a certain level of education, intelligence, rationality and honesty for this 
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to work, and if one is just a little bit short in several categories, it will not succeed. 
The same of course is true for much of human understanding, and so the vast 
majority will never get anything that is at all subtle. As with the Nowak, Wilson, 
Tarnita paper, I am sure that Dawkins, Franks and others would have been willing 
to go over this chapter and explain where it goes astray.. 
 
The major problem is that people just do not grasp the concept of natural selection 
by inclusive fitness, nor of subconscious motivations, and that many have 
‘religious’ motivations for rejecting them. This includes not just the general public 
and non-science academics, but a large percentage of biologists and behavioral 
scientists.   I recently came across a lovely review by Dawkins of a discussion of the 
selfish gene idea by top level professional biologists, in which he had to go over 
their work line by line to explain that they just did not grasp how it all works. But 
only a small number of people like him could do this, and the sea of confusion is 
vast, and so these delusions about human nature that destroy this book, and are 
destroying America and the world will, as the Queen said to Alice in a slightly 
different context, go on until they come to the end and then stop. 
 
 
 
